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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Turkish
Accession to a European
Customs Union
P. Lynn Kennedy and Cereal Atici
The entrance of additional countries into a European customs union, in this case Turkey, and
its impact on agriculture are examined. Results from a trade simulation model are used as
components of a Political Preference Function and utilized within a game theoretic framework
to identify the optimal strategies for Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. Turkey’s best interest, from
an agricultural perspective, involves adoption of agreements made in the Uruguay round of
GATT as a developing country rather than applying EU protection. Although free trade is not
the optimal solution, simulations indicate that the solution does involve the reduction of
agricultural protection levels.
Turkey’s quest for membership in the European
Union (EU) has a long history. Turkey applied for
membership in the European Community (EC) in
1959. The resulting negotiations led to the Ankara
Agreement, creating an association between Tur-
key and the EC. The aim of this agreement was to
promote continuous commercial and economic re-
lations between the two economies. To achieve this
objective, the agreement established three stages:
the preparatory stage; the transitional stage; and
the final stage. The first stage began in 1964 and
ended in 1969. This stage included the provision of
concessions from the EC to Turkey. The second
stage began in 1970 and covered a 12-year transi-
tional period, during which reciprocal concessions
were made. Although the final stage was planned
to start in 1995 the outcome of this process is not
yet certain (GATT 1994).
While the politicrd and economic conditions
necessary for Turkey’s accession have not yet been
satisfied, the Luxembourg summit reaffirmed Tur-
key’s eligibility to join the EU on the same basis as
the other applicant states (Eurecom 1998). To this
end, the European Council has specified three ar-
eas it considers necessary for Turkish admittance
to the Union: 1) intensification of the EU—Turkey
Customs Union; 2) implementation of financial co-
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operation; and 3) approximation of Turkish laws
toward the EU laws (Eurecom 1998). The EU—
Turkey Customs Union, which came into effect in
January of 1996, guarantees the free circulation of
industrial goods and processed agricultural prod-
ucts. Although agricultural products are excluded
from the treaty, Turkey is progressively adopting
many aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy
(Republic of Turkey 1996). The future inclusion of
agriculture would increase the intensity of the
EU—Turkey Customs Union and contribute to-
ward Turkey’s meeting the necessary conditions
for EU admittance.
International agricultural trade negotiations,
such as those between the EU and Turkey, reflect
the linkages between domestic farm policies and
agricultural protection. The recent agricultural ne-
gotiations conducted within the Uruguay round of
GATT highlighted several interdependencies be-
tween the EU and the United States. As Turkey and
various other countries lobby to form agreements
with the EU, the potential trade effects will influ-
ence the decisions of European and U.S. policy
makers alike. EU officials must account for in-
creased production possibilities, shifts in consumer
demand and preferences, and the potential interest
group coalitions that will result from Turkish ac-
cession. U.S. policy makers must consider these
changes in EU preferences and market power as
they deal with and react to their European coun-
terparts,
Scenarios of this type are examples of the prob-
lems that exist in analyzing agricultural trade ne-
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interdependence (Kennedy et al. 1996), Countries
considering the ratification of both bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements must consider the re-
sults of their choices with respect to the policies of
other countries. In addition, countries weighing the
prospects of regional trade agreements must con-
sider the reaction of cooperating countries and the
rest-of-the-world as they negotiate with prospec-
tive partners.
The impact of these interrelationships between
countries raises questions as to how agricultural
policies are formulated given the reactions of other
countries. Policy makers often have some knowl-
edge as to the response their new policies will in-
duce among other nations. Rational countries will
formulate agricultural policy based on the expected
reactions of other relevant countries. As a result,
game theory can provide a useful framework for
analyzing agricultural policy decisions given the
interdependence of agricultural policy.
In an interdependent world, agricultural policies
affect both domestic and international markets. As
a result, it is beneficial to know both the desired
goal and potential consequences of various agri-
cultural policies. The objective of the research pre-
sented here is to examine the effects of liberalized
trade combined with Turkish accession to a Euro-
pean Customs Union. Particular emphasis is placed
on the impact of these policy changes on trade in
agricultural products. The empirical analysis will
involve ten agricultural products that each play a
significant role in the European Union, Turkey,
and the United States in terms of production or
consumption: beef and veal, dairy milk, corn,
wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and
pork and poultry.
To accomplish these objectives, this study em-
ploys a partial equilibrium trade simulation model,
Modele International Simplifie de Simulation
(MISS) (Mah4 et al. 1988). MISS is a partial equi-
librium trade model that simulates, in a compara-
tive static framework, the effects of various policy
decisions, Once the model is initialized, simula-
tions are conducted that mirror the effects of the
Uruguay Round agricultural agreement. To mirror
the policy decisions of the respective governments,
consumer, producer, and government budget
weights, as components of a Political Preference
Function (PPF), are estimated. These weights,
when combined with the net gains or losses to
producers, consumers, and government, reflect the
net gains or losses to the economies as perceived
by policymakers. The PPFs resulting from the vari-
ous scenarios are then evaluated in a game theo-
retic framework to determine the Nash equilibrium
solution to the specified game.
Theoretical Framework
The foundation of this analysis is based on the
model developed by Mah6 et al. (1988) with sub-
sequent modifications made by Johnson et al.
(1993) and Kennedy et al. (1996), In the model, N
commodities are produced, consumed, and traded
by K main countries and a politically passive rest-
of-the-world. Vectors of supply, demand, and ex-
cess demand are used to describe the levels of ag-
gregate production, consumption and trade for
each country. The supply sector in country k pro-
duces some combination of the N commodities in
order to maximize profits given prices, technology
and endowments. Aggregate production of the N
commodities is described by the vector of supply
functions, Sk (P~k; XJ, where P~k is the vector of
prices observed by the supply sector and Xs~ is a
vector of exogenous variables, such as technology,
input prices, and endowments for the supply sector
of country k, Aggregate consumption of the N
commodities is described by the vector of demand
functions Qk (PQk; X~k), where P~k is the vector of
prices observed by the final demand sector and
XQ~is a vector of exogenous variables for country
k, The aggregate level of trade in the N commodi-
ties for country k is described by the vector of
eXCeSS demand functions Mk (Psk, pQk; xsk,xQk)
where Mki > 0 indicates net imports and &lki <0
indicates net exports of commodity i for i = 1, 2,
... , N.
Governments intervene in domestic markets
through either the use of price (m) or supply/
demand shift (u) instruments. Price instruments,
denoted as A:ki for producers and Afiki for consum-
ers in country k of commodity i, affect the prices
observed by the supply and final demand sectors.
With the world price of commodity i represented
as Pwi the domestic price functions for country k
are:
(1) ‘Ski = ‘Ski (Ayki, Pwi) and
pQki = pQki (A~ki, Pwi), for i = 1, 2, . . . . N.
Supply/demand shift instruments, shown as A~kl
and A~ki for producers and consumers, respec-
tively, of commodity i in country k, are implicit
elements of vectors Xsk and XQ~which shift supply
and demand functions by modifying nonprice ele-
ments of the producers’ or consumers’ decision
process. Supply/demand shift instruments include
policies such as area reduction programs, subsidi-
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grams. In order to make these instruments explicit
the vectors X~~and X~~ are defined as follows,
(2) X~k = X~k (A~kj; ‘Sk) and ‘Qk
= xQk (A~ki; ‘Q~)
where ~~~ and FQ~ signify exogenous non-policy
variables.
Through the substitution of the domestic price
functions (1) and the function of explicit variables
(2), the aggregate supply, demand and excess de-
mand are expressed as functions of world price,
policy instruments and exogenous variables in the
terms,
(3) Sk[Psk(A;k, Pw)>A:k; ‘Sk],
(4) Qk [pQk (Afik, ‘W), Azk; ‘Qk], and
(5) ‘k [pSk (A;k! Pw), ‘Qk (A;k,Pw)>
&, A& ~sk,~Qk]
where Pjk (A:, Pw) = [Pjl (A,:, Pw), pj2 (AJ~, Pw),
. . . . ‘jN (A~, Pw)I for J = S, Q.
Let the main countries be denoted as countries 1,
2,. ... K and the rest-of-the-world as country K +
1. The vector of excess demand functions for the
rest-of-the-world is shown as kf~+l (Pw; XK+~)
where X~+l is the vector of exogenous variables for
the rest-of-the-world. Through the adjustment of
world prices, world markets are assumed to clear,
i.e., world markets are competitive. Therefore,
(6) Xk ‘k [pSk (A;k, Pw), ‘Qk (A;k, Pw),
A:k, A~k; Wsk, ~Qk] + A4K+1 (Pw; XK+l) = O,
where the right-hand side of the equation is an N x
1 vector of zeros. Letting the vector of country k’s
actions (A~k,A~k, Ask, A&) be represented W %
world prices are expressed as functions of actions
in the equation
(7) Pw = Pw ((AI; ~sl, ~Ql),
(AZ; X&; ‘Q2), . ..> (AK; -%K, ~Qd, XK+I ).
Throughout the process of agricultural policy
formulation, the welfare effects of various actions
are taken into account by the government. Policy-
makers behave as though they are using a weighing
system to compare the gains and losses of various
groups. The product of a weight and a money met-
ric welfare measure (e.g., consumer and producer
surplus) is assumed to reveal the relative influence
of a group’s ability to transfer policy support to
itself. This concept is referred to as a Political Pref-
erence Function (PPF). The PPF used in this analy-
sis is a weighted, additive function of money met-
ric welfare measures for various societal groups. It
is the objective function which, through their
policy choices, policy makers behave as though
they seek to maximize.
This concept is utilized by Gardner (1983 and
1991) in analyzing income redistribution in agri-
culture. In addition, agricultural economists have
estimated PPFs in order to examine policy effects
among various agricultural groups (Rausser and
Freebaim 1986), The PPF is similar to the political
support function used in the Stigler-Peltzman
Regulatory Model discussed in Stigler (1971),
Peltzman (1976), Hillman (1982), and Magee et al.
(1989). It is assumed that competition among
groups for political influence and the desire of the
poIitical process to appease these groups gives rise
to an equilibrium where the gradients of the PPF
with regard to policy instruments are zero. Based
on this assumption, the weights are estimated em-
pirically at the point where the gradients are zero
for the observed level of policy instruments.
This approach presumes a two-level game, one
of which has been completed prior to this analysis,
The completed level is the non-cooperative game
among groups for political influence which deter-
mines- the PPF weights as parameters. In other
words, the game where domestic groups pursue
their interests by pressuring the government to
adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek
power by constructing coalitions among those
groups, has been completed. A description of this
first-level game can be found in Roe (1995), Ef-
fectively, given the weights, the second level of the
game occurs where the desire of the policy to ap-
pease these groups causes them to behave as
though they choose the level of policy instruments
to maximize the PPF, conditional on the action of
the other countries. This approach is similar to Put-
nam’s (1988) description of trade negotiations as a
two-level game.
The application of this method in this particular
static analysis presumes a certain degree of inde-
pendence between the two game levels, i.e., the
selection of policy levels in stage two does not
affect the weights determined in stage one. The
true nature of this two-level game, however, is ex-
pected to be dynamic; the outcome of one stage
serves as an input into the other. Despite this, the
effect of the selection of policy instrument levels
on coalition formation and the lobbying process is
not instantaneous. As a result, the two-level game,
as presented here, is appropriate in a static frame-
work. However, it must be remembered that since
political influence does change over time, this two-
level game must allow for feedback from one level
to the other if it is to be used in a dynamic frame-
work.150 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
In order to use this framework, a number of
additional conditions must hold (Bullock 1994;
von Cramon-Taubadel 1992), including knowl-
edge of the welfare functions which map instru-
ments to well being, that the observed strategies
are Pareto optimaJ for the given weights, and that
the set of feasible welfare outcomes be compact
and convex over the domain of policy instruments.
These conditions are assumed to hold. Finally, to
estimate the PPF weights from observed policy
choices, i.e., the outcome of the first level game,
the number of policy instruments must equal the
number of interest group preference weights so
that the resulting matrix of First Order Conditions
is of full rank (Bullock 1994), By construction, this
is always possible since, in principle, groups can
be defined in finer subgroups such that rank is
always obtained. If estimation yields the same
weight for any subgroups, they can then be aggre-
gated into a larger subgroup.
Let A~ = (A&& A&, Ask, A&) represent the ac-
tions of country k. A similar function, Ak+, exists
for the other main countries (denoted by k+). Pro-
ducers are grouped according to commodities with
their welfare defined as the profit obtained through
the production and marketing of that commodity.
Assuming differentiability, the welfare of the
group producing commodity i in country k is ex-
pressed as the line integral:
(8) rrik (P~k;x~k ) = f: ‘k(P~/c; XJ dP,,i,
where Psi is the domestic producer price of com-
modity i. The vector,
(9) ~k (P~k; X~k) [~lk (P~k; x~k),
~zk (P~k; x~k) ,. ... ~~k (P~k; XJ]
signifies quasi-rents over the N producer groups. In
addition, the utility function is expressed as:
(10 Uk (pQk; xQk)= J ~i f2/c(pQk; ‘Qk) dpqi,
where P,qi is the domestic consumer price of com-
modity 1.
In order to express producer quasi-rents (9) as a
function of government policies, equation (1) is
substituted for P.$k,equation (2) is substituted for
the expression variable X~k, equation (7) replaces
the world price Pw, and non-policy exogenous fac-
tors ~ = (~sl, X&?,. . . . X&, ~Ql, -&QD . . . . rQK,
XK+I) are suppressed, thus obtaining,
( 11) ~k (Ak, Ak+) =
~k {Psk [A:k, Pw (Ak>Ak+)], A;k} .
In the same manner, by substituting equations
(1), (2) and (7) into equation (10) and suppressing
P, consumer utility is expressed as a function of
government policies, obtaining
(12) Uk (Ak,Ak+) =
‘k {pQk tA;k, l’w(&, 4+)1, A;/c}.
In order to express the budget function let a
transpose of an N x 1 vector be denoted by T.
Producer receipts are Psk” S:, consumers spend
‘Qk” Q:, andexcessdemand(SUPPIY)is purchased
(sold) in the world market at price Pw for a total
monetary value of Pw oMl. Using equations (3),
(4) and (5) the budget is shown as:
(13) Bk (Psk, ‘Q/+ Pw; x)
= (PQk - Pw)
x Q: (pQk; ‘Qk)
- (P~k - Pw)
X S: (Psk; Xsk).
Equation 13 allows government expenditures at-
tributed to various policy scenarios to be com-
puted. The difference in expenditures under alter-
native scenarios versus those in the status quo are
used to determine the amount of budget savings
available for compensation. Substituting in equa-
tion 13 for Psk, pQ/@Pw, Xsk and xQk and suppress-
ing ~ as before, the budget of country k, as a
Won of government policies, is shown as:
Bk (&.>Ak+) = Bk {PM [f$jc>f’w@k>Ak+)],
‘Qk [A;k, PW (& Ak+)],
PW (&, &+), f% A&].
Having expressed producer quasi-rents, con-
sumer utility and the budget as functions of gov-
ernment policies, the budget weight is normalized
to one and the PPF, as a function of government, is
shown as:
(15) vk (A//n, Ak+) = ~k (Ak, Ak+) “ Ask
+ Uk (Ak, Ak+) “ ~Qk + Bk (-% fh+)
where hsk is a strictly positive N x 1 vector which
represents the relative political weights of the pro-
ducer groups in country k and kQk is a strictly
positive scalar representing the relative political
weight of the consumer group in country k.
In modeling the policy decision process of in-
terdependent countries, a Nash equilibrium occurs
where each country chooses policy that maximizes
its PPF given the policy choice of the other. This
equilibrium is defined using a best response corre-
spondence. For a given Ak+,government k chooses
Al, one possible best response to Ak+, such that
(16)
Vk (A;, Ak+) = Vk (Ak, Ak+) for all Ak l Ak>Kennedy and Atici
where Ak is the set of all possible actions, which
can be employed by government k. Every Ak+ el-
ement OfAk+has at leaSt one Al element OfAk that
is a best response for country k. A Nash equilib-
rium is defined as the set ~f actions (A;, A;+) whe$e
A; is a best response to Ak+ for COuntry k, and Ak+
is a best response to A; for country k+.
Differentiating equation (15) with reSpeCt to Ask
and AQk, the first order necessary conditions for a
maximum are
(17)
avk‘ fmk duk ‘h .—
dA~k dA~k r3A~k ‘k
+
13vk = CWIk NJk“






Under the assumption that vk is concave in Ak
given Ak+, and Al which solves equation (16)
maximizes Vk Thus, by definition, Af is a best










exits, then h~~ and ~~k can be calculated by rear-
ranging equation 17. Thus,
A -mk duk.-1 dBk
Sk —— —
(20) c3Ask c3Ask dAsk
‘“ mk auk . dBk
hQk —— —
-aAQk 8AQk= -dAQk-
can be solved for hsk and hQk.
These weights represent the political influence
of various producer and consumer groups relative
to the government budget sector in the formulation
of agricultural policies. In order to ascertain the
changes in welfare resulting from policy changes,
Mod&le Intemationale Simplifi6 de Simulation
(MISS) is used. MISS is a simplified world trade
model that simulates, in a comparative static
framework, the effects of various policy actions
(Mah6 et al. 1988).
The MISS model utilizes several identities to
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simulate the effects of policy changes on the sec-
tors of production, derived demand, and final de-
mand for the regions examined. The model oper-
ates on the principle of Walrasian equilibrium.
Policy changes undertaken by a country cause ad-
justments in the world price levels, resulting in
changes in supply and demand, and a rebalancing
of world trade. The resulting changes in producer
welfare, consumer welfare, and government bud-
get expenditures are used as approximations of the
partial derivatives in equation 20. When equation
20 is solved for hsk and )tQk, the PPF weights are
obtained.
Empirical Analysis
For the purposes of this examination the world is
divided into four regions: the European Union, the
United States, Turkey, and a politically passive
rest-of-the-world. The analysis is conducted using
ten commodity groupings: beef and veal, dairy,
corn, wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton, sugar, tobacco,
and pork and poultry. To initialize the model, pro-
tection ratios are calculated for producers and con-
sumers in the U.S., EU, and Turkey for the base
year 1992. These protection ratios, combined with
production and consumption levels, are used as a
base from which all simulations will be conducted.
Nominal protection ratios were calculated by the
ratio of domestic price to border price. Prices have
been calculated in terms of commodity values for
all products. Nominal protection ratios for produc-
ers and consumers are presented in table 1.
It must be noted that this analysis assumes a
politically passive rest-of-the-world. Regardless of
fluctuations in world prices, the nominal protection
ratios for the rest-of-the-world remain constant at
one, As a result, the scenarios analyzed do not
reflect any liberalization or policy adjustments on
the part of the rest-of-the-world. The quantity and
price data, and exchange rates used to initialize the
model were gathered from Euromonitor (1995),
European Commission (1995), FAO (1994), IMF
(1996), Republic of Turkey (1994), USDA
(1994b), USDA (1992), USDA (1994c), and
USDA (1994d). Supply and demand elasticities are
obtained from Gardiner et al. (1989) and are pre-
sented in table 2.
The PPF weights represent the political influ-
ence of various producer and consumer groups
relative to the government budget sector in the for-
mulation of agricultural policies. These weights are
derived through the evaluation of incremental
changes in the observed policies from their base
year levels and have been estimated using 1992152 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Nominal Protection Ratios (1992) and Base and Final Year (2001) GATT
Commitments for the U.S., EU, and Turkey
—1992 Nominal Protection Ratios— —GATT Commitment—
Producers Consumers Base Year Finat Year











1.01 1.56 1.37 1.01 1.19 1,70 1.31 2.37 1.37 1.26 1.87 1.35
1.59 2.44 1.32 1.23 1.11 1.68 1.59 2.16 1.32 1.50 1.92 1.31
1.00 1,88 1.47 1.02 1.56 1.21 1.02 1.53 1.47 1.00 1.33 1.45
1.20 1,63 1.09 1.17 1.25 1,00 1.05 1.60 1.09 1.02 1.38 1.08
1.60 1.88 2.00 1.03 1.24 1,25 1.12 2.15 2.00 1.07 1.73 1.97
1.00 2,35 1.43 1.00 1.06 1,07 1.00 2.35 1.43 1.00 2.14 1.41
1.18 1.38 1.29 1.18 1.38 1,29 1.38 1.38 1.29 1.32 1.32 1.28
1.61 1,64 1.52 1.51 1.46 1.80 2.87 2.40 1.52 2.43 2.12 1.50
1,17 1.13 1.22 1.17 1.13 1,22 1.17 1.13 1,22 1,14 1.11 1.21
1.00 1.41 1.00 1.06 1.17 1.53 1.00 1.41 1.00 1.00 1.34 1.00
Source: EuropeanCommission, 1995;Republic of Turkey, 1994;USDA, 1994a;USDA, 1994b;USDA, 1994c,andUSDA, 1994d.
data. 1These changes are used as approximations of
the partial derivatives in equation (20). These ap-
proximated weights are normalized such that the
budget weight is one. When equation (20) is solved
for hfi and hci, the PPF weights are obtained.
The PPF weights, shown in table 3, are consis-
tent with the protection ratios presented earlier.
There are a few weights, however, that may con-
tradict standard perceptions regarding political in-
fluence. Among these, tobacco producers have the
lowest weight among U.S. producers. This may not
be surprising given the relatively low protection
ratio for tobacco (table 1) and the recent health
concerns regarding tobacco usage in the United
States. On the other end of the spectrum, soybeans
have the third highest weight among EU producers.
While soybean producers may be a very small
group relative to other EU agricultural producers,
this result is not surprising given the relatively high
nominal protection ratio for EU soybeans (table 1)
and the relatively high PPF weight previously es-
timated for EU oilmeals (Kennedy et al. 1996).
Finally, while rice does not have a large share of
total agricultural production in Turkey, its role in
domestic agricultural consumption contributes to
its having its country’s largest weight. Addition-
ally, it may be the small number of rice producers
and their ability to organize that allows the rice
sector to garner political support.
1This analysis involves the grouping of producers according to com-
modities. Differing levels of diversification exist between and within
Europe andthe United States. Althoughproducersdo not organizesolely
on the basis of product lines, the political preference function,estimated
with respect to commodities, reflects the preferences of the polity. In
turn, the resulting commodity weights may be used to detemrirre the
relative political influence of producers based on the respective product
mix.
It is also interesting to note that all weights for
Turkey are larger than one. Remember that the
political preference function is normalized such
that the budget weight is one. One reason for in-
terest group weighings exceeding that for the bud-
get sector in Turkey is that public agricultural en-
terprises administer the purchasing and support
payments of these products, mostly crops, and pay
high prices, usually over world prices. Conversely,
because of the low income of the population, these
high prices are not transferred to the consumers.
While this has a negative impact on the budget, the
resulting budget pressure is viewed by the Turkish
polity as an acceptable tradeoff given the large
number of low-income consumers that benefit
from lower food prices.
To find a Nash equilibrium for the countries
involved, a game-theoretic framework is used. The
normal-form representation of a game is specified
by the following: the players in the game, the ac-
tions available to each player, and the payoffs cor-
responding with each action combination. In this
case there are three players: the U.S., the EU, and
Turkey (TUR). Let Ak denote the set of actions
available to player k, for k = US, EU, TUR. Let
(Aus, AEU, ATUR) denote combination of actions,
and let Pk denote player k’s payoff function where
Pk (Aus, AEU, ATUR) is player k’s payoff resulting
from actions (Au~, A~u, A~u~). The normal-form
representation of a three-player game specifies the
player’s action spaces (Al, AZ, A3) and their payoff
functions (Pl, P2, P3). This game is denoted by G
= {Al, AZ, As; P], P2, P3).
In the normal-form game, G = {Al, Az, A3; PI,
Pz, P3} let A~l and Ak2 be feasible strategies for
player k, i.e., they are members of A~. Action A~l
is strictly dominated by A~2 if, for all combinationsKennedy and Atici A Game Theoretic Analysis of Turkish Accession 153
Table 2. Direct Price Elasticities for the U.S.. EU. and Turkev
------supply— —Demand—







































































Source: Gardiner et al., 1989
of actions available to the other players, k’s payoff
from playing Akl is strictly less than k’s payoff
from playing A~2, such that Pk (A~l, A_~) < P~
(Akz, A_k) for all A_k = A_~. Rational players will
not play strictly dominated strategies, a concept
which is useful in the identification of solutions to
bimatrix games. If a unique solution to a three-
player, normal-form, noncooperative game be-
tween the U.S., EU, and Turkey is to be found, it
must be self-enforcing. Each player’s predicted ac-
tion must be that player’s best response to the pre-
dicted action of the other player. This is the con-
cept of Nash equilibrium. In the three player nor-
mal-form game G = (Al, Az, A3; P1, P2, P3} the
actions (Al *, AZ*, A3*) are a Nash equilibrium if,
for each player k = 1, 2, and 3, A~* is player k’s
best response to the actions specified for the other
player’s –k, such that P~ (A~*, A_~*) ~ P~ (Ak,
A_k*) for all A~ e A~.
This analysis incorporates game theory to iden-
tify optimal strategies for the countries involved.
The U.S. and EU choose among four strategies:
status-quo (ST); base year reductions until the final
Table 3. 1992 Political Preference Function Weights
year according to the Uruguay round of GATT
(GT); 50% reduction from their base year protec-
tions (50); and a 100% reduction from their base
year protections (FT). The status-quo scenario pre-
sented here uses the base period protection levels
adopted by these countries in the Uruguay round
agreement. As a result, the U.S. and EU base pro-
tection levels are different, and generally higher,
than those actually employed in 1992. The protec-
tion levels for all scenarios are calculated as per-
centage reductions from this GATT base scenario.
The GT scenario simulates the final protection re-
ductions to occur by the year 2001, ranging from
fifteen to thirty-six percent. These protection ratios
are presented in table 1.
To model its choice to join or to not join the
Customs Union, Turkey chooses between two
strategies: the application of its agreed upon Uru-
guay Round protection reductions without joining
a European Customs Union (GT~u~); and joining a
European Customs Union and setting agricultural
protection levels equal to those of the EU (CU~u~).
It is important to note that Turkey’s choice of the
United States European Union Turkey
Rank Weight Rank Weight Rank Weight
Beef & Veal 8 0.96 4 1.21 8 1.10
Dairy 1 1.13 1 1.32 4 1.18
Corn 5 1.07 5 1.17 3 1.22
Wheat 6 1.06 2 1.25 11 1.02
Rice 1 1.13 6 1.07 1 1.77
Soybeans 10 0.86 3 1.22 4 1.18
Cotton 4 1.08 11 0.84 6 1.14
sugar 1 1.13 8 1.02 7 1.13
Tobacco 11 0.83 10 0.91 10 1.07
Pork & Poultry 7 0.97 7 1.06 9 1.09
Consumers 9 0,94 9 1.00 2 1,24
Source: Calculated.154 October 1999
strategy CUTu~ involves setting Turkish agricul-
tural protection within any set of scenarios to the
corresponding EU level: ST~u; GT~u; 50~u; or
FTEU.
Each country k chooses some action A~ G A~ to
maximize its PPF given the action choices of the
other countries. The games are presented in the
following manner. If the players’ action spaces are
specified as Au~, A~u, and ATu~ and their payoff
functions as Pus, P~u, and PTu~, then this game is
denoted by G = {Au~, A~u, ATu~; Pus, P~u,
PTu~}. This simulation will determine the Nash
equilibrium between the U.S. and EU when their
actions are ST, GT, 50, and FT, while the actions
available to Turkey are GT and CU. Thus, the ac-
tion space is A~ = {ST~, GT~, 50~, FT~ } for k =
US, EU and A~ = {GTk, CUk} fork = TUR.
Two separate games will be analyzed. The first
incorporates the weights approximated previously.
The second game utilizes PPFs with weights of
one, to reflect the outcome if policymakers view all
groups equally. It is hypothesized that the first
Agricultural aod Resource Economics Review
game will better reflect the process occurring be-
tween the three countries.
As can be seen from table 4, both the U.S. and
the EU have strictly dominant strategies by choos-
ing the 50% reduction from their protection levels.
As a result the unique Nash equilibrium occurs at
{50u~, 50~u, GTTu~}. At this action, PPF values
are 749, 725, and –88 for the U.S., EU, and Tur-
key, respectively, relative to the base period ac-
tions.
The Nash equilibrium is identified in the follow-
ing manner. Suppose Turkey chooses GTTu~.
When the U.S. chooses STu~, the best response for
the EU is to choose action 50~u since the EU’s
PPF is higher than that for each of its other avail-
able actions. It is obvious that the EU is better off
choosing the action 50~u. Regardless of the action
chosen by the U.S., the EU, as a rational agent, will
choose 50~u. On the other hand, regardless of the
strategy chosen by the EU, the U.S. will respond
by choosing action 50u~ since its PPF is highest at
this point. Thus, the U.S. and EU have s&ictly
Table 4. Non-Cooperative Game Between the United States, European Union, and Turkey,
1992 Political Preference Function Weights
GT,U. EU Actions
U.S. Actions ST~u GTEU 50EU m,”
2 -2 54 204
STU, 1 259 1038 -1489
15 -19 -57 -153
274 288 356 571
GTu~ 35 304 1066 -1521
6 -27 –66 -162
618 664 749 1089
50U, -36 -49 72s –1962
-15 -48 -88 –184
211 346 331 719
mu~ -809 –1318 371 –2467
–47 -86 -121 –218
CUT”R EU Actions
U.S. Actions ST,U GT,U 50.” FTEU
-53 -32 43 254
STu~ -69 221 995 -1509




-40 268 1024 -1545




-438 -88 679 -1980




-886 –1360 328 -2489
-928 –652 -435 -51
Note: The unique Nash equilibrium occurs at {50u~, 50~u, GTTUJ,
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Table 5. Non-Cooperative Game Between the United States, European Union, and Turkey,
Political Preference Function Weights Equal to One
GT,U. EU Actions
US. Actions ST,U GT,U 50EU FTEU
2 -133 -269 -602
STu~ 1 3647 6859 9721
5 -11 -36 -91
673 562 455 219
GTu~ -127 3563 6781 9682
1 -15 -41 -96
1654 1586 1522 1469
5ou~ -996 2834 6136 9051
-13 -30 -54 -110
2238 2271 2155 2235
mu, -2195 1009 5289 8307
-34 -48 -75 -131
CUTUR EUActions
U.S. Actions ST~u GTBU 50BU FTEU
-28 –146 -271 569
STu~ 26 3670 6850 9693
-361 -242 -138 -64
641 550 451 253
GTu~ -104 3589 6772 9599
-366 -247 -144 -70
1618 1569 1514 1499
50”, –970 2860 6126 9023
-390 -271 -166 -94
2199 2248 2141 2259
FT., -2168 1030 5293 8283
-425 -298 –198 -127
Note: The unique Nash equilibrium occurs at {IWus, lTEu, CUTUJ.
These numbers represent changes in PPF for the U.S., EU, and Turkey, respectively, measured in million U.S. dollars.
dominant strategies of 50u~ and 50~u, respec-
tively. The same result occurs when Turkey
chooses CU~u~. Thus, since 50u~ and 50~u are
strictly dominant strategies, the iterative elimina-
tion of strictly dominated strategies narrows the
game solutions to Turkey’s choice. between GTw~
and CUTu~ at {50u~, 50~u }. As a rational agent,
Turkey compares its payoff from GT~u~ (-88) to
that from CU~u~ (–389) and chooses GT~u~ in
order to maximize its PPF. Thus, the Nash equi-
librium solution to this game occurs at {50u~,
50~u, GT~u~) .
Now consider the scenario in which all weights
are equal to one. The PPF results for this scenario
can be seen in table 5. As can be seen from these
results, the unique Nash equilibrium occurs at free
trade in this {FTu~, FT~u, CUm~}, It must be
remembered that, since Turkey chooses to join the
European Customs Union in this game, Turkey ef-
fectively chooses free trade since the EU’S optimal
strategy involves the adoption of free trade. This
outcome is consistent with theory in terms of gains
from trade.
Conclusions
According to the results of this analysis, it is in the
best interest of Turkey, from an agricultural stand-
point, to adopt agreements made in the Uruguay
Round of GATT as a developing country rather
than joining the European Customs Union and ap-
plying EU protection. Conversely, the Turkish ag-
ricultural sector can benefit by joining the Euro-
pean Customs Union, provided that the EU adopts
free trade. The losses suffered by Turkey under
most scenarios can be partly attributed to the rela-
tively high weight of the Turkish Consumer sector.
In instances where the terms-of-trade favors the
Turkish Producers the negative effects felt by Con-
sumers dominate gains to producers due to the
Turkish PPF weights.156 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Results show that producer surpluses in the U.S.
and EU will decrease due to the fact that these
countries decrease their protection levels. Since
these decreases in protection increase world prices,
the consumer surplus in Turkey will decrease as
well. The Uruguay Round of GATT has eliminated
quotas in many products by replacing them with
tariff equivalents. However, these tariff equiva-
lents were higher than those previously utilized in
the U.S., while the EU also employed higher pro-
tection bases for protection reduction.
The Nash equilibrium occurred at the level of a
50% reduction for both the U.S. and EU using the
estimated weights. When all sectors are weighted
equally, the Nash equilibrium occurred at free
trade. Several key results are related to Turkey’s
accession into a European customs union and the
Nash equilibrium. The results show that Turkey’s
accession into this customs union is not in Tur-
key’s best interest from an agricultural standpoint.
Turkey can apply its GATT commitments and be
better off remaining outside this customs union.
Among the significant products of this analysis
is the result that the Nash equilibrium for the U.S.
and EU occurred at 50% reduction from their base
period protections with the estimated weights
when Turkey is not in the EU. If Turkey were to
join the customs union, the Nash equilibrium
would again be a 50% reduction from the base
level protection for the U.S. and EU. When
weights are equal to one, the Nash equilibrium
occurs at free trade levels for the U.S. and EU, with
Turkey choosing to join the European Customs
Union. This result is consistent with theory and,
based on observable behavior, suggests that the
countries involved weight the sectors analyzed in a
manner consistent with the weights used in this
analysis.
Free trade is not an optimal solution using the
estimated weights. Both the U.S. and EU benefit
from reducing protection levels to a point between
the existing protection levels and free trade. Al-
though free trade is not the optimal solution in
agriculture, simulations indicate that there exists an
optimum with freer trade. Future negotiations can
identify areas of further protection reductions. This
seems likely since the Nash equilibrium occurs at a
level of protection that is less than GATT commit-
ments for the U.S. and EU.
The results have several implications. Turkey’s
loss in agriculture, from joining this European cus-
toms union, may be compensated for by the poten-
tial gains in the manufacturing and service sectors
as well as EU funding for various sectors in the
form of structural payments, Turkish policy-
makers should evaluate these gains and losses, de-
ciding whether it is in the country’s best interest to
join customs unions of this type. Comparisons can
be made in a similar framework to include the
manufacturing and services sectors. The frame-
work and results of this study can contribute to
future analyses that consider various welfare as-
pects of trade liberalization and integration.
References
Bullock, D.S. 1994,“In Search of Rational Government: What
Political Preference Function Studies Measure and As-
sume.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics
76(August):347–361
Eurecom: The Monthly Bulletin of European Union Economic
and Financial News. 1998.Luxembourg Sets Stage for EU
Enlargement, The EuropeanCommission, Luxembourg,at
http://www.eumnion.or@cgi-bitiframes.cgi?news/eurecoti
1998/ecom0998.htm,
Euromonitor. 1995. European Marketing Data and Statistics,
London.
European Commission. 1995. The Agricultural Situation in the
European Union, 1994 Report. Luxembourg.
FAO. 1995. Production Yearbook 1994. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations. Rome.
Gardiner, W., V. Roningen, and K. Liu. 1989.Elasticities in the
Trade Liberalization Database, USDA ERS Staff Report
No. AGES 89-20, Washington.
Gardner, B.L. 1983. “Efficient Redistribution through Com-
modity Markets,” American Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics 65(May):225–234.
Gardner, B.L. 1991. “Redistribution of Income through Com-
modity and Resource Policies.” In Commodi@ and Re-
source Policies in Agricultural Systems, R,E. Just and N.
Bockstael, eds. 129–142. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Generat Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 1993. Mernational
Trade. Geneva.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 1994. Trade Policy
Review: Republic of Turkey. Geneva.
HiHman, A.L. 1982. “Declining Industries and Political-
Support Protectionist Motives.” American Economic Re-
view 72(December):1180–1187,
International Monetary Fund. 1996, International Financial
Statistics. Data on Diskette, Washington.
Johnson, M., M. Mah4, and T,L. Roe. 1993. “Trade Compro-
mises between the European Community and the United
States: An Interest Group-Game Theory Approach.” Jour-
nal of Policy Modeling 15:199–222,
Kennedy, P.L., H, von Witzke, and T.L, Roe. 1996.“Strategic
Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence and Exchange
Rate: A Game Theoretic Analysis.” Public Choice 88:43–
56.
Magee, S.P., W.A. Broth, and L. Young. 1989. Black Hole
Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Mah6, L., C, Tav?ra, and T. Trochet, 1988. “An Anatysis of
Interaction Between EC and U.S. Policies with a Simpli-
fied World Trade Model: MISS.” Background paper for
the Report to the Commission of the European Communi-Kennedy and Atici
ties on Disharmonies in EC and U.S. Agricultural Policies.
Rennes.
Pekzmrrn,S. 1976.“Towards a More General Theory of Regu-
lation.” Journal of Z.uw and Economics 19(August):211-
240.
Putnam, R.D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games.” Journal of International Or-
ganization 42(Summer):427-460.
Rausser, G.C., and J. Freebaim. 1986. “Estimation of Policy
Preference Functions: An Application to U.S. Beef Import
Quotas.” Review of Economics and Statistics 56:437-449.
Republic of Turkey. 1996.The Customs Union Between Turkey
and the European Union. The Republic of Turkey, Busi-
ness and Economy, Ankara, at http://www.turkey.org/
cust.htm.
Republic of Turkey. 1994. Ekonomik Rapor 1994. Ankara
Roe, T. 1995. “Political Economy of Structural Adjustment A
General Equilibrium Interest Group Perspective.” In A. de
Janvry, S. Radwan, E. Sadoulet, and E. Thorebeke, eds.,
A Game Theoretic Analysis of Turkish Accession 157
State, Market and Civil Organizations, 112–138. London:
Macmillan Press LTD.
Stigler, G.J. 1971.“The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell
Journal of Economics 2(spring):3-21.
United States Department of Agriculture. 1994a. Agricultural
Overview of the GATJ/Uruguay Round. Washington.
United States Department of Agriculture. 1994b. Agricultural
Statistics. Washington.
United States Department of Agriculture. 1992. Agricultural
Statistics, Prices Received Index. Washington.
United States Department of Agriculture. 1994c. Estimates of
Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents. Govern-
ment Intervention in Agriculture 1982–1992. Washington.
United States Department of Agriculture. 1994d. World Situa-
tion and Outlook. Washington.
von Cramon-Taubadel, S. 1992.“A Critical Assessment of the
Political Preference Function Approach in Agricultural
Economics.” Agricultural Economics 7(3/4):37 1–394.